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MALICIOUS NEXUS
SINO-PAK NUCLEAR AND MISSILE COLLABORATION 
Interestingly, the 1963 Sino-Pak border agreement states that China would negotiate the border 
with the 'relevant sovereign authority' after India and Pakistan settle the Kashmir dispute. Given 
the strategic importance of the Karakoram Highway, it would not be in China’s interest for the 
Indo-Pak dispute to be settled in India’s favour and for the area to return to Indian control. Therein 
lies the rub. Beijing’s assistance to Islamabad ranged from providing designs of a tested nuclear 
weapon to giving fi ssile material for putting together two nuclear bombs to assistance with 
the Chashma and the Khushab facilities. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
C
ost-benefi t analysis is an intrinsic part of
international relations and integral to 
understanding behaviour of states and the choices 
they make. Countries always try to fi nd ways of 
maximising benefi t while minimising their costs. 
China has put this strategy to good use while 
providing assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear and missile 
domain. By providing assistance to the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons programme, China – at least cost – has attempted 
to counter the Indian nuclear capabilities. The Chinese 
assistance can be seen as part of a larger attempt to tie 
down India to its Western neighbour, thereby thwarting 
New Delhi’s regional ambitions. In doing so, China and 
Pakistan seem to have put into practice, Kautilya’s maxim 
"the enemy of my enemy is my friend."
 
Relations between China and Pakistan were however 
not always this close. Though formal diplomatic relations 
were established between the two countries in May 1951, 
Beijing viewed Pakistan as being fi rmly entrenched in 
the Western camp. It was only with the worsening of 
Sino-Indian relations after the 1962 border clash and the 
souring of Sino-Soviet relations that China and Pakistan 
began reaching out to each other. 
 
Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto realised 
the importance of the Sino-Pak relations very early 
and worked hard to lay the foundations of this unique 
relationship. Bhutto described the Sino-Pak relationship 
as "my greatest achievement and contribution to the 
survival of our people and the Pakistani nation." Bhutto's 
perseverance over eleven years and his visits to China in 
February 1972, September 1974 and April 1976 led to the 
historic July 1976 Sino-Pak agreement. 
 
Between 1963 and 1966 as Foreign Minister of Pakistan 
ZA Bhutto initiated the process of reaching out to Beijing. 
In March 1963, immediately after the Indian loss to China 
in the border clash, Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement 
with China. Pakistan ceded about 5,000 square kilometres 
of Indian territory south of Mintaka Pass bordering Gilgit. 
This piece of territory proved crucial for building the 
Karakoram Highway which runs between Kashgar and 
Gilgit. The strategic importance of the highway can be 
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gauged from the fact that during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, 
China used the highway to transport military supplies to 
Pakistan. To date, China continues to spend enormous 
amounts of money to develop an 'economic corridor' 
between Kashgar and Gwadar which traverses through 
the Karakoram Highway. 
 
Interestingly, the 1963 Sino-Pak border agreement 
states that China would negotiate the border with the 
'relevant sovereign authority' after India and Pakistan 
settle the Kashmir dispute. Given the strategic importance 
of the Karakoram Highway, it would not be in China’s 
interest for the Indo-Pak dispute to be settled in India’s 
favour and for the area to return to Indian control. 
Therein lies the rub.
 
Nuclear Weapons Collaboration
Gary Milholin, founder of the Wisconsin Project on 
Nuclear Arms Control, describes the importance of the 
Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear programme in 
the following terms. He states, “… if you subtract Chinese 
help, there wouldn’t be a Pakistani nuclear programme.” 
 
The nature and scope of Sino-Pak nuclear assistance 
mirrors the assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the 
Chinese nuclear programme in the initial years. Beijing’s 
assistance to Islamabad ranged from providing designs 
of a tested nuclear weapon to giving fi ssile material for 
putting together two nuclear bombs to assistance with the 
Chashma and the Khushab facilities. 
 
China is believed to have provided Pakistan 
with the design of the nuclear weapon (Chic-4) 
which it tested in 1966. Gordon Corera in his book 
Shopping for Bombs: Rise and Fall of AQ Khan has an interesting 
story to tell. He narrates how AQ Khan carried around 
papers relating to a nuclear weapons design in his briefcase. 
During one of his foreign trips, Western intelligence 
agents got access to Khan’s briefcase. The spooks were 
shocked to fi nd a drawing of simple yet effective design 
of a nuclear weapon and steps detailing how to make 
the bomb.  Later, the Americans realised that the design 
provided in the early 1980s a proven design of China’s 
fourth nuclear test. Also, China is believed to have allowed 
Pakistan to test its nuclear device at the Chinese Lop Nor 
nuclear test site in 1989. 
 
If this was not enough, Pakistan is also believed to 
have received, weapons grade uranium suffi cient to put 
together two nuclear devices. In addition, China also 
helped Pakistan build the unsafeguarded (50-70 MW) 
plutonium production reactor at Khushab. Beijing is 
suspect of having supplied excess heavy water to Kanupp 
could have been used by Pakistan to power up the 
unsafeguarded Khushab plant. Also, Pakistan is believed 
to have received assistance from China for completing 
the plutonium reprocessing facility at Chashma. The 
facility was originally to be completed by France but was 
suspended in 1979 with the French backing out of the 
agreement under American pressure. 
 
In 1986, China is also suspected to have transferred 
tritium to Pakistan. Tritium is used to trigger hydrogen 
bombs and boost the yield of fi ssion weapons. 
Subsequently, in 1995, the news 
about transfer of 5,000 ring magnets 
hit the headlines. The ring magnets 
were destined for use in Pakistan’s 
centrifuge enrichment plant at 
Kahuta. The news of the sale broke at 
a time when Pakistan was lobbying 
the Clinton Administration to push 
the Brown Amendment through 
the US Congress. The Brown 
Amendment sought to dilute the 
Pressler legislation and – despite 
the continued proliferation of 
nuclear technology – was to grant 
a one-time waiver of the Pressler 
legislation and authorise transfer 
of military supplies to the tune of 
US$ 368 million. 
 
News reports hinted at Chinese 
offi cials privately admitting to 
selling the 5,000 ring magnets to 
Pakistan. They however, claimed that the sale did not 
violate the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines as 
the ring magnets were not magnetised. This is nothing but 
a convenient interpretation of the guidelines and Chinese 
obligation therein. 
 
What was more surprising to many was the Clinton 
administration’s response to the whole transfer of ring 
magnets. Both China and Pakistan got away very lightly 
as the US did not sanction either country for the transfer. 
The Clinton administration chose to turn a blind eye and 
was satisfi ed with a cursory statement from China to the 
effect that it would conform to nuclear non-proliferation 
rules and regulations. 
 
However, as events a year later highlighted, not much 
changed. In 1996, China is believed to have sold a special 
industrial furnace to Pakistan. This furnace was an 
important component in Pakistan’s progress towards 
building its nuclear weapons as the furnace could melt 
the fi ssile material into the shape of a nuclear bomb core. 
 
Missile Transfers To Pakistan
We now turn to the Chinese assistance towards Pakistan’s 
ballistic missiles capability. The nuclear-capable ballistic 
missiles provided Islamabad with the wherewithal 
to effectively deliver its nuclear weapons. China has 
helped Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme by 
transferring the mobile, solid-fuelled M-9 or DF-15 and 
M-11 missiles. Pakistan has modifi ed these missiles into the 
Shaheen-1 and the Ghaznavi missiles. 
 
Ghaznavi (M-11)
It is believed that China and Pakistan signed a deal 
for the transfer of over thirty M-11 missiles in 1987. 
These missiles were to be transferred in a completely 
built-up form, were solid-fuelled and could carry a nuclear 
warhead. The deal came to light in November 1992 and 
violated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
provisions given that the missile could transfer a 500 kg 
payload to a distance over 500 kilometres. China however 
contested this stating that the missile could travel only 
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280 kilometers with a payload less than 500 kilograms which 
was allowed under the MTCR provisions. The MTCR allowed 
for transfer of missiles under 300 km range carrying less than 
500 kg payload.
 
A technical analysis by Prof Chandrasekhar, 
Dr Arvind Kumar and Prof Rajaram Nagappa of the 
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore titled 
Assessment of Pakistan Ballistic Missile Programme: Technical 
and Strategic Capability has established that the Chinese 
did transfer a version of the M-11 missile to Pakistan. 
The missile name d as Ghaznavi was tested for the fi rst 
time in May 2002. 
 
In June 1991 the US imposed sanctions on China for the 
fi rst time for transferring M-11 technology to Pakistan. 
Following Chinese promises to abide by the MTCR in 
November 1991 and accession to the NPT in March 1992, 
US waived the sanctions on March 23, 1992. However, by the 
middle of next year, China was back to its old tricks. Thus on 
August 24, 1993, the US imposed new sanctions on China 
for again transferring M-11 missile and related equipment 
to Pakistan. In August 1996, news reports indicated that 
China was believed to be helping Pakistan to construct an 
M-11 production facility. Chinese technicians are also believed 
to have visited the Sarghoda and Tarwanah missile facilities 
to assemble these missiles and train Pakistani personnel 
on their handling. 
 
Shaheen-1 (M-9 / DF-15)
China is also believed to have exported the 
M-9 (DF-15) to Pakistan. A single-stage, solid fuelled 
missile, the M-9 with a range of 600 kilometers was 
manufactured by the China Precision Machinery Import and 
Export Corporation (CPMIEC). The missile was fi rst fl ight 
tested in June 1988 and is believed to be more accurate than 
the Scud-B missiles. 
 
The study by the National Institute of Advanced Studies 
mentioned above used openly available images to calculate 
the diameter of both the Shaheen-1 and M-9 missiles as 
1 metre. This common diameter validates Chinese help 
with the Shaheen-1 programme. However, this study also 
points out that the lengths of the Shaheen-1 missile are 
greater than M-9 missiles, thus implying that the missile 
parameters were modifi ed. Similarly, the warheads of 
the M-9 and the Shaheen-1 had several similarities but 
differences exist like the absence of fi ns in the M-9 missile’s 
warhead. In late 2001, media reports indicated the China 
Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation 
(CPMIEC) has been supplying Pakistan with components for 
Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2. 
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
China has also played an important role in the expansion 
of the Pakistani nuclear power sector. 2011 fi gures 
indicate that nuclear power contributed about 3.8 TWh or 
3.8 per cent of the total Pakistan’s energy matrix. 
 
During the November 1989 visit of Chinese Premier Li Peng, 
it was announced that China would sell a 300 MWe nuclear 
power plant to Pakistan under a nuclear power agreement. 
Subsequently, in 1991 China and Pakistan signed a bilateral 
nuclear power agreement. 
 
As part of this agreement, it was initially agreed to build 
two 300 MWe pressurised water reactor (PWR) nuclear plants 
at Chashma. These are called Chashma-1 and Chashma-2. 
Chashma-1 was designed by Shanghai Nuclear Engineering 
Research and Design Institute (SNERDI). It began commercial 
operations in May / June 2000. Construction of Chashma-2 
was started in December 2005.
 
Following the successful passage of the Indo-US nuclear 
agreement, the Pakistani and Chinese governments 
announced plans to build two 320 MWe nuclear plants 
(Chashma-3 and 4) at the same site. The nuclear plants were 
to be funded by China. Both governments claimed that 
Chashma-3 and 4 were to be ‘grandfathered’ under the 1991 
Sino-Pak agreement. This is contrary to China’s disclosure to 
the NSG members when it joined the group in 2004 that the 
‘grandfather’ clause would apply only to life-time support 
and fuel supply for the safeguarded Chashma-1 and 2 nuclear 
power plants, supply of heavy water and operational safety 
service to the safeguarded Karachi nuclear power plant and 
the supply of fuel and operational safety services to the two 
safeguarded research reactors at PINSTECH. However, 
despite the reservations, construction at Chashma-3 began in 
May 2011 followed by Chashma-4 in December 2011.
 
Subsequently, in November 2010 the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC) reportedly signed a construction 
agreement with China National Nuclear Corporation 
(CNNC) for a fi fth unit at Chashma. In February 2013 a further 
agreement was signed by PAEC with CNNC for supply 
of 1,000 MWe units.
At that time, it was not clear whether the 1,000 MWe 
unit would be commissioned at Chashma or elsewhere. In 
June 2013, it came to light that the CNNC 1,000 MWe class 
reactors would be used for Karachi-2 and 3 (KANUPP-2 and 
3). These were to be co-located near Karachi unit 1 which 
is the oldest 125 MWe nuclear power plant in Pakistan 
commissioned way back in 1971. 
 
As seen from the above discussion, Chinese assistance to 
the Pakistan military and civilian nuclear programme has 
been substantial. In addition, China has also sold the M-9 and 
M-11 missiles which Pakistan modifi ed as the solid fuelled 
Shaheen-1 and Ghaznavi missiles. In recent years, following the 
Indo-US nuclear deal, China is extending a similar nuclear 
power deal to its ‘all-weather ally’ Pakistan. As described 
by Chinese Premier, Li Keqiang, the sapling of Sino-Pak 
relations that Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto planted decades ago is now
“exuberant with abundant fruits.” China has effectively used 
its assistance to the Pakistani nuclear and missile programme 
to counter India’s rise at least cost to Beijing.
News reports hinted at Chinese officials privately 
admitting to selling the 5000 ring magnets to 
Pakistan. They however, claimed that the sale 
did not violate the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) guidelines as the ring magnets were not 
magnetised. This is nothing but a convenient 
interpretation of the guidelines and Chinese 
obligation therein
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I
n the 4th anniversary issue of the DSA magazine, 
combined with an Air Force special edition, it is only 
fi tting the OODA loop (for Observe, Orient, Decide 
and Act), be included. Revisiting this somewhat 
forgotten decision-making process is key to enhancing 
performance in combat, politics and management. By 
understanding how the OODA loop can help us all make 
decisions, it also brings to light possible ways to interrupt 
the enemy’s decision-making process. 
Originally a military strategy, the end-users of the 
OODA loop are not limited to military personnel alone. 
Recently politicians, business leaders and soldiers alike 
rely on some systematic decision-making process on a 
daily level. In fact everybody navigates an OODA loop 
thousands of times a day without even realising it. So 
what is it and how can we benefi t? Is it the sole reference 
point for managing actions? More importantly, what are 
the surrounding forces that can infl uence a faster, more 
accurate outcome of an OODA loop trajectory?
The OODA loop was created by Colonel John Boyd 
(1927-1997) during the US engagement in the Korean War 
of the 1950’s. The process went through countless tests 
in real battle scenarios and proved an outright success. 
Boyd, considered to be one of the greatest combat pilot 
strategists of all time, was a cigar chomping Top Gun who 
ruffl ed Pentagon feathers with his maverick theories. 
As with most theories and scientifi c laws there was a 
beginning. The basis was originally conceptualised to 
achieve success in air-to-air combat, developed out of 
Boyd's Energy-Manoeuvrability theory (E-M theory) 
and his observations on air combat between the Russian 
made Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15s and North American 
F-86 Sabres in Korea. Harry Hillaker, the Chief Designer 
of the F-16 stated that, “Time is the dominant parameter. 
The pilot who goes through the OODA cycle in the 
shortest time prevails because his opponent is caught 
responding to situations that have already changed”.
OODA Loop Explained 
Observation: The gathering of data and activities in a 
given environment. Keen observation requires fi lters as 
data comes in and is recognised. Filters determine what 
information is stored, used or deleted.
Orientation: The discipline of calculating key 
performance indicators; making predictions, based on 
training, knowledge and dictated by culture. 
Decision-making: Utilising previously collated data, 
training and knowledge to understand the outcome of 
the decision based on the observation and orientation. 
The Decision element is a crucial one. If the observation 
The OODA loop was created by Colonel John Boyd (1927-1997) during the US 
engagement in the Korean War of the 1950’s. The process went through countless 
tests in real battle scenarios and proved an outright success. The OODA loop is 
in fact a complex model but one that only refl ects the complicated way our minds 
work. It’s an active process with built-in feedback loops that infl uence and change 
based on the previous stimulus and response. There have been many attempts 
to modify the loop, however the normal route is to either add to it or change 
the sequence where applicable and in some circumstances place emphasis 
on one element over another.
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